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APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR
C.T.A. IN FLORIDA
THOMAS A. THOMAS* AND TOM MAXEY"

*

Today in Florida there exists considerable confusion and inconsistency
with reference to the order of preference to be accorded in the appointment
of all administrator cure testamento annexo. For example, a will recently
offered for probate in Florida provided for a testamentary spendthrift trust
and nominated a foreign bank and trust company as executor and trustee.
Since the foreign executor could not qualify under Florida law, 2 the Court
felt it was required to appoint the spendthrift beneficiary, who was the
closest relative of the deceased, as administrator cum testamento annexo in
direct violation of the testator's intention. The Court reasoned that since
the statute3 provided no specific order of preference in the appointment of
administrators cum testanlento annexo, the statutory order of preference for
intestate administrators 4 should not only be applicable, but is mandatory.
However, in another case," which is the only reported case in Florida, a
different result was accomplished. In that case, the decedent named alternate executors, neither of whom could qualify. Under the will, there were
some beneficiaries sui juris; however, there were many more who were
minors. The beneficiaries who were sui juris consented to the appointment of one Achor as administrator cune testamento annexo. Thereafter,
the sister of the decedent, and only surviving next of kin, petitioned the
County Judge for the revocation of Achor's appointment and for her own
appointment in accordance with the Florida Statutes6 prescribing the order
of preference for the appointment of intestate administrators. In rejecting
the contentions of the petitioner, the County Judge held that the statute
relied upon by the petitioner was applicable to intestate situations only. On
appeal, the Circuit Court through the Honorable Stanley Millcdge, in sustaining the lower court, declared:
There is no Statute which prescribes whom the County Judge must
prefer in designating a person to execute the testator's testamentary plan, when the person sclectcd by the testator cannot act. In
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1. See Estate of Leon S. Green, Comnty Judge's Court, Broward County, Florida,
No. 10717 (1956).
2. FLA. S'rAT. § 732.47 (1955).
3. Ibid.
4. FLA. STAT. § 732.44 (1955).
5. In re Sawtelle's Estate, Circuit Court, Dade County, Fla., 8 Fla. Supp. 166

(1955).

6. See note 4 supra.
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such cases, he has a wide discretion. Certainly it is no abuse of
discretion to appoint one who is beneficially interested in the estate
or one who is requested by one who takes. This is precisely what the
legislature provided-the right to handle the fund shall attach to

those who will take the fund whether by Will or intestacy.
The obvious disagreement of the courts with reference to this problem
can be attributed to the following three circumstances:
1) The Florida Supreme Court has not as yet been confronted
with the problem.
2) Uncertainty of the probate law.
3) Refusal on the part of the probate courts to adopt the cardinal
rule that the intent of the testator is to be given effect whenever possible.
It is, therefore, the purpose of this article to reexamine the preference
sections of our probate code; to ascertain legislative shortcomings and to

suggest will clauses designed to eliminate present uncertainties in so far as
possible.
THE PREFERENCE PROVISIONS

In determining the proper interpretations of our present Florida Statutes8, the common and statute law in effect in England on July 4, 1776 is
in full force and effect except as abrogated or modified by statute or constitution."
An examination of the common law clearly demonstrates that the
English Courts have consistently held that in testate as well as intestate
situations, the right to administration follows the right to property. Thus
it is stated in a well known English treatise:'
A Statute of administration, 21 Hen. 8 c/5, (1529) which still governs grants in respects of deaths before 1926, provided only for intestacy and the refusal of the appointed executor to act. In cases
not within the statutes, the Court inmaking a grant of administration with the Will annexed, was left to the exercise of its discretion
in the choice of the administrator. No person had such a legal

right to preference as could be enforced by application to the common law courts. The rule of practice in the ecclesiastical court,
in such a case, was to consider which of the claimants had the

greatest interest in the effects of the deceased, and to grant administration accordingly,

if there were no peculiar circumstances.

Hence, in all cases where no executor was appointed, or the appointed executor failed to represent the Testator, the residuary
legatee, if there was one, was preferred to the next of kin, and en7. In re Sawtelle's Estate, supra note 5 at 166, 167.
8. FLA. STAT. § 732.44 (1955).
9. ILA. STAT. § 2.01 (1955).

10. WILLIAMS, LAw OF EXECUTOR.S ANn ADmNISTRATORS § 335 (13th ed., Perry

1953).
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titled to administration with the will annexed. The principle that
the right of administration should follow the right of property was
so strongly favored by the court that, though in the case of the
appointed executor's renunciation the letter of the statute expressly
directed the ordinary to grant administration to the next of kin,
yet the spirit of the act was held, both by common lawyers and
civilians, to exclude the next of kin where there was a residuary legatee, on the ground that the next of kin had no interest.
The residuary legatee or residuary devisee, even where there is no
present prospect of any residue, is entitled to administration in preference to the next of kin, legatees, annuitants and to creditors. He
is so entitled even though only residuary legatee in trust.
An examination of commonly accepted American works on the subject,
from old to new, bears out this current statement of English authority. In
a work'1 published in 1898 we find the principle stated thusly:
In cases of testacy, if the executor dies, renounces, or is incompetent, the right of Letters of Administration cum testamento annexo
goes to the residuary legatee, or, if he is incompetent or renounces,
to the other legatees, instead of to the husband, widow or next of
kin. Mention should be made of the right of the residuary legatee
to Letters of Administration cum testamento annexo in preference
to either surviving husband, widow, or next of kin or creditors. This
right is based upon the principle, before stated, that the right to
administer follows the right to the estate, or the principal interest
in it. As in cases of testacy the residuary legatee has the greatest
interest in the estate, it is held at common law, and is often confirmed by statutes in the United States, that in case the executor
dies, renounces, or is incompetent, the residuary legatee is the
person entitled to Letters of Administration in preference to all
others, whether surviving husband, widow, next of kin or others.
And if the residuary legatee is dead, or renounces, or incompetent,
the grant of letters will go to the other legatees, in accordance with
their interest, unless statutory provisions expressly direct otherwise.
In 1923, Judge Woerner stated in his celebrated treatise upon the subject as follows:
In granting Letters cum testamento annexo the court is governed
by the same principles which determine the appointment of general
administrators, chief among which is that in the absence of resultation, right to administer follows the right to the personal property.
Hence residuary legatees are preferred, in the grant of letters cum
testamento annexo, to the next of kin or widow; and this preference
extends to the representatives of residuary legatees who survive
the testator and have a beneficial interest, such representative being
to the next
entitled to letters cum testamento annexo in preference
12
of kin, unless otherwise determined by statute.
11. SIMON, GREENLEAF & CROSWELL, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 88 (1898).

12. WOERNER, A TREATISE ON
WILLS § 245 at 82 (3d Ed. 1923).
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And in 1939, Professor Rollison 3 of Notre Dame phrased the principle
similarly:
A testator may have no preference as to who shall serve as executor,
and so he may not name in his will any person as executor; or
having inade such appointment in the Will, the appointee may
renounce, neglect to qualify, or be legally incompetent. In all such
cases letters testamentary would be issued and administration with
the Will annexed granted to the proper person. If there is no statutory provision on the subject the right to be appointed administrator with the Will annexed should follow the property, just as in
ordinary administration.
It is rather apparent that in the absence of contrary statutory provisions,
the right to administration iMures to the beneficiaries of the decedent's
property, whether the estate be testate or intestate. Our probate code is
in accordance with this general principle in intestate situations, since the
statute14 confers preference in administration in the same order as the
intestate order of distribution. 15 Similarly, in situations in which a will is
discovered after granting of intestate letters of administration, the statute
preferred, not the intestate distributees, but those who will be entitled to take
under the will.' 6 Apparently, however, under present holdings if the same will
were discovered prior to intestate beginning, a different result would be
reached, and the intestate order of preference would be applicable, even
though the person entitled to preference under the intestate statute had no
interest whatsoever under the wiill.' Thus we find an anomalous situation
existing in the Florida laws.
Examination of the historical background of Florida statutes makes it
clear that such a result was never intended by the Legislature, and it is,
therefore, apparently attributable to the courts.
The Florida Statutes in regard to preference were first enacted in 1828
and as originally adopted,15 provided:
Section 7. Be it further enacted that letters of administration shall
be granted to the representatives of the intestate who apply for the
same, preferring first to husband or wife and next, such others as
arc entitled to distribution of the estate of the intestate in the order
of consanguinity; and if no such persons apply for administration
or no such persons apply for administration or if one applying can
n!ot comply with the provisions of this act after citation duly published for the term of six weeks, once a week in some newspaper
where intestate died, if any be printed there, if not, in some newspaper printed in the adjoining district or state, and also by writing
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

ROLLINSON, THE LAw OF WILLS
FLA. STAT. § 732.44 (1955).

FLA. StAT.

§

218 at 408 (1939).

§ 731.23 (1955).

FLA. STAT. § 732.44 (1955).
See note I supra.

18. See

COMPILATION OF THE PUBLIC ACTS OF TI.

TERRITORY OF Fyo iA,

PASSED PRIOR TO

LECISLATIVE COUNCIL OF TIlE

1840, (Duval 1839),
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posted at three public places in the county, then the said court or
judge may grant administration to a creditor of the intestate or
some other fit person; but, if any will shall, after granting letters
of administration, be produced and duly approved, the aforesaid
letters of administration shall be revoked and letters testamentary
granted to the executors of said will; provided they shall be ready
and willing to be qualified, and if not, the letters of administration
previously granted shall stand good and the will be therefore annexed.
Section 8. Be it further enacted that previously to the granting
of Letters of Administration, it shall be the duty of the Court or
the Judge to require the person applying for administration to
state upon oath or affirmation to the best of his knowledge and
belief, whether there be any heirs or legal representatives of the
intestate in being or not, which statement shall be in writing and
subscribed by the party making the same and filed in the clerk's
office and such person applying as aforesaid for letters of administration, shall also be required to state upon oath or affirmation
whether according to the best of his or her knowledge and belief
the deceased died without a will and to swear or affirm that he will
well and truly administer all and singular the goods, chattels, rights
and credits of said deceased, make a just and true inventory of the
same, pay his debts as far as the assets of the estate shall extend
and the law direct, and make a fair distribution according to law
and render a true account of the administration of the estate when
thereto required. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted from the above cited provisions that the only
departure from the common law was in that situation in which a will was
found after intestate proceedings had been commenced, in which event, if
no executor was able to qualify, the Legislature directed that the administrator already appointed in intestate proceedings be allowed to continue
to serve.
When the Legislature revised the Probate Act in 1933,' 9 although the
aforesaid Statutes were changed in wording, it does not appear that the
results obtainable thereunder were in any way altered. These 1933 revisions
constitute the current Florida Statutes with one unimportant exception,
and until 1947 included the same provision in derogation of the common
law, i.e., if a will was found and probated after intestate letters had been
granted, and if there were no executors ready and willing to qualify, then
Letters of Administration C. T. A. would be given to the administrator
already qualified. However, this modification in derogation of the common
law was clearly applicable only in the situation indicated by the Legislature and could not have been reasonably construed as extending such preference to testate situations without an intestate beginning.
Moreover, in 1947, the Legislature saw the error of its ways and
amended the statute so as to revert to the common law principle, by stating
19. See Laws of Fla. e. 16103, § 80 (1933).
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that if a Will were found and probated after intestate letters had been
granted and if the executors named therein were unable or unwilling to
qualify, then the previously granted intestate letters would be revoked and
letters cum testamento annexo granted with preference being given to the
person, if otherwise qualified, selected by the persons beneficially interested
in the estate.
We thus observe a complete cycle in which the Legislature, having
indicated that the common law of England is in force in Florida unless
specifically changed, has modified the common law in a minor respect and
then reversed this modification by statute reiterating the common law.
Accordingly, since Florida Statutes § 732.44 (1955), grants preference in administration in intestate cases in the same order as the intestate order of
distribution, the statutory result in Florida today appears to be that the
right to administer goes to those persons who take the estate, whether it
be testate or intestate.
This construction has been adopted by the Statutory Revision Department of the Attorney General's Office in its codification process, as is indicated by the fact that all sections, from 732.22 through 732.42 are clearly
applicable only to testate situations. However, section 732.43 and the
sections following provide for intestate situations and other problems such
as executors de son tort. Moreover, the Supreme Court in an intestate
situation,20 has indicated that the provisions of section 732.44, relating to
preference in the appointment of administrators, are not effective until the
provisions of 732.43, relating to procedural requirements of petition for
administration, are carried out:
We are of the opinion that before the provisions of 732.44, F.S.,
F.S.A., relating to preference in the appointment of an Administrator are effective they must give way to provisions of Section
732.43, F.S., F.S.A., relating to procedural requirements of Petition
for Letters of Administration.
Inasmuch as 732.43 requires a statement under oath that the decedent
died without a will, neither it nor 732.44, under the Supreme Court's mandate, could possibly be applicable to testate situations when such an oath
could not be made. Moreover, section 732.23 specifically states that no
citation (such as is required in petition for intestate letters) need be served
before the probate of a will. Further, the practice of combining petition
for probate with petition for letters cum testamento annexo seems the universal practice in Florida, judging from a rather comprehensive review of
the form books and the forms supplied by the various county judges. None
of these even suggest an allegation that the applicant has cited others.
In summary, at present there is no Florida statute which expressly prescribes any preference in the appointment of administrators cumetestamento
20, In re Bush's Estate, 80 So.2d 673 (FIa. 1955).
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annexo' 1 or which modifies or abrogates the common and statute law
principle in effect in England in 1776, that the right to administration cure
testamento annexo follows the right to the property, accordingly, this
principle is in effect in Florida, and courts should prefer for appointment
as administrator cure testatnento annexo those who take under the will
rather than those who would be entitled to appointment under the intestate statute.
PRoPosED LEGISLATION

Although, as heretofore indicated, there should be no confusion with
regard to preference in appointment of administrators curitestaniento annexo, nevertheless it cannot be denied that such confusion exists, and that
appropriate legislation should be considered. It is felt that amending the
existing § 732.44 to read as follows, would clarify legislative intent and eliminate the confusion:
732.44 Preference in appointment of administrator.1) In the granting of letters of administration in intestate eases,
the following preference shall be observed:
(a) The surviving spouse shall first be entitled to letters.
(b) The next of kin, at the time of the death of the decedent,
shall next be entitled to letters.
(c) If there are several next of kin, equally near in degree, the
one selected in writing by a majority of them who are sui jurists shall be
appointed. If no such selection is thus made, the county judge may exercise
his discretion in selecting the one best qualified for the office.
(d) If no application is made by the next of kin, the county
judge in his discretion, may appoint sonic capable person, but no person
may be appointed under this subsection who is employed by such county
judge or who holds public office under such county judge, nor any person
who is employed by or holds office undcr any judge exercising probate
jurisdiction.

(e) Persons entitled to an estate may select a disinterested person as administrator; and if such person is otherwise qualified, lie shall be

appointed.
(f) After letters of administration have been granted, if any
person who is entitled to preference other than the person appointed and
upon whom citation was not served and who has not waived his preference
seeks the appointment, letters granted may be revoked, and such person

21. Sec note 2 qupra.
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may have letters of administration granted to him after citation and hearing upon his application.
(g) After letters of administration have been granted, if ally will
is produced and probated, the aforesaid letters shall be revoked and letters
testamentary shall be granted to the executor of said will, or letters of administration cum testamento annexo shall be granted, if there is no executor
ready and willing to qualify, preference being given to the person as provided
under part (2) hereof. No such will shall be probated without citation to
the administrator.
2) In the granting of letters of administration cune testamento annexo, the following preference shall be observed:
(a) if no executor shall have been nominated by the testator, or
if nominated shall be unqualified for sonie reason or reasuns other than
residence, then the person chosen by the persons beneficially interested in
the estate shall be first entitled to letters cum testamento annexo. In the
determination of those beneficially interested, the trustee or trustees of
testamentary spendthrift or other long term trust, or trust during minority,
rather than the beneficiaries of any such trust or trusts, shall be construed
to be beneficially interested.
(b) if the executor nominated by the testator shall be unquaalified only because of non-residence in the State of Florida, then the person
chosen by the executor nominated by the testator shall be first entitled to
letters cum testamento annexo.
INTERIM IIEA suRES

The cautious scrivener, even though agreeing thoroughly with that which
has previously been discussed, cannot help but recall a comparable situation
of conversing between bars with a client who "could not be arrested"; and
will desire sonic additional mcthod or methods of preventing the possible
interference of some court appointed adininistrator cume testamento annexo
with no interest ii the property. It is submitted that ordinarily this situation
arises because of the inability of a foreign executor named in the will to
qualify in the probate jurisdiction; and consequently, if the executor or
executors named in the will, but unable to qualify, or the heirs were given
the right to appoint the administrator cun. testaniento annexo, the problem
would be eliminated to a great extent. A clause in the will, similar to the
following, is suggested:
NOMINATION OF EXECUTOR
I hereby nominate and appointL...
of
, as Executor of this my Last Will and
Testament; or, in the event lie -is unable or unwilling to act, by
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reason of his death, inability to qualify in some jurisdiction other
than Florida, or for any other reason, either originally or thereafter,
I hereby nominate and appoint the
'Bank
located in Miami, Florida, as Executor of this my Last Will and
Testament. In the event the said
,or
his successor, the
Bank, should both be
unable or unwilling to act, whether by reason of death, inability
to qualify in some jurisdiction other than Florida, or for any other
reason, either originally or thereafter, I then direct that they, or the
survivor of them, shall nominate an executor of this my Last XVill
and Testament; or if they or the survivor of them shall be unable
or unwilling for any reason so to nominate, I then direct that [the
person or persons with the largest interest under the will] shall
nominate an executor of this my Last Will and Testament; and the
court having jurisdiction, whether domiciliary or ancillary, shall
appoint said nominee executor of this iny Last Will and Testament
with all powers herein contained as fully as if I myself had made
such nomination.
The effectiveness of such a clause, of course, depends upon the right
of the testator to delegate the power to nominate his executors. Although
the question does not appear to have been presented in Florida, it has
23
arisen in eleven states in the United States, i.e., Alabama,2 2 Connecticut,
Delaware,2 4 Indiana,25 Michigan, 2 11 Minnesota, '7 Montana, "8 New Jersey,21 New York,30 Pennsylvania,,' and Wisconsin ,32' as well as in English,," Scotch 34 and Canadian 35 cases. In each of these jurisdictions, the
power has been upheld; and no jurisdiction has been discovered in which
it has been denied. Accordingly, there is every reason to believe that it
would be held to be valid in Florida; and that an executor under a foreign
will containing such a clause, who could not qualify in Florida, would be
able to nominate one to act for him, and thus to effectively carry out the
intent of the testator.

22. Thomas v. Field, 210 Ala. 502, 98 So. 474 (1923).
23. Bishop v. Bishop, 56 Conn. 208, 14 A. 808 (1888).
24. State, for the Use of Browne v. Rogers, 1 Houst, 569 (l)el. 1858).
25. Wilson v. Curtis, 151 Ind. 471, 51 N.E. 913 (1898).
26. Brown v. Just, 118 Mich. 678, 77 N.W. 263 (1898).
27. In re Crosby's Estate, 218 Minn. 149, 15 N.W.2d 501 (1944).
28. In re Effertz's Estate, 123 Mont. 45, 207 P.2d 1151 (1949).
29. Mulford v. Mulford, 42 N.J. Eq. 68, 6 Atl. 609 (1886); Hutton's Executor v.
Hutton, 41 N.J. Eq. 267, 3 At]. 882 (1886).
30. Hartnett v. Wandel, 60 N.,Y. 346, 19 Am. Rep. 194 (1875).
31. In re Boning's Estate, 214 Pa. 19, 63 Atl. 296 (1906).
32. Cole v. Watertown, 119 Wis. 133, 96 N.W. 538 (1903).
33. Fornum v, Administrator General, 14 App. Cas. 651 (P.C. 1889); Goods of
Deichman, 3 Curt. Ecc. 123, 163 Eng Rep. 676 (P. C. 1842); Goods of Cringan, I
Haag. Eccl. 548, 162 Eng. Rep. 673 (P.C. 1828).
34. See Goods of Cringan, supra note 33. In this case the court speaks of such delegation as being "not very unusual in Scotland" and its exercise in the ease then before
the English court had already been approved "by the Commissary Court at Dumfries."
35. Morin v. Morin and Gorneau, 43 Que. Off. R. 373 (1940).

